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Abstract Individuals’ level of depression has been
shown to systematically determine their amount of effort-
related cardiovascular reactivity (see Brinkmann and
Gendolla in Motiv Emot, 31:71–82, 2007; J Pers Soc
Psychol, 94:146–157, 2008). By means of a mood cue
manipulation the present study aimed at providing a con-
clusive test whether this is due to the informational impact
of depressed mood. After habituation, students with low
versus high depression scores worked on a memory task
under ‘‘do-your-best’’ instructions. Half of them received a
cue before the task, suggesting that their current mood may
have an impact during task performance. As expected,
dysphoric participants showed higher systolic blood pres-
sure reactivity during task performance than nondysphorics
when no cue was given. This pattern was reversed in the
cue condition, indicating that dysphorics effectively man-
aged to reduce the depressive mood impact on their task
demand appraisals and effort mobilization.
Keywords Depression  Dysphoria  Informational mood
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Introduction
Depression has been associated with a negative and pes-
simistic perception of the self, the world, and the future
(Beck 1967). To what extent such negatively colored
perceptions can influence and determine one’s mental
processes and behavior has been demonstrated in many
cases and domains. Examples are mood-congruency
effects on judgments and estimates and mood-congruent
attention and memory biases. Depressed individuals tend
to make more pessimistic judgments, pay more attention
to negative stimuli, and especially remember and retrieve
negative stimuli better (for reviews see Gotlib et al. 2000;
Mineka et al. 2003; Mogg and Bradley 2005). Recently, it
has been demonstrated that depressed mood also influ-
ences people’s effort mobilization in terms of their car-
diovascular response during execution of various mental
tasks (Brinkmann and Gendolla 2007, 2008). These
findings have been interpreted as a mood-congruent
informational impact on individual’s task demand
appraisals (see e.g., Gendolla et al. 2001; Kavanagh and
Bower 1985; Wright and Mischel 1982), which in turn
determine effort mobilization. However, these recent
studies cannot provide clear evidence that an informa-
tional mood impact is responsible for the effects of
depressed mood on cardiovascular reactivity. It is con-
ceivable that depression has an impact on effort mobili-
zation during task performance due to depressive
symptoms other than momentary mood like, for instance,
fatigue or concentration problems. The present study thus
aims to close this gap and to provide a conclusive test
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whether it is indeed depressed mood’s informational
impact that influences effort mobilization.
Dysphoria, effort mobilization, and cardiovascular
reactivity
Based on motivational intensity theory (Brehm and Self
1989) and the mood-behavior-model (Gendolla 2000), we
have postulated that individuals with dispositionally
depressed mood should perceive mental tasks as more
demanding and difficult and should thus mobilize more
effort during task performance as long as success is pos-
sible and worthwhile (Brinkmann and Gendolla 2007,
2008). In these experiments motivational intensity, that is,
effort mobilization was operationalized as participants’
cardiovascular reactivity. This operationalization is based
on Wright’s (1996) integration of motivational intensity
theory with the active-coping approach by Obrist (1981)
and has been corroborated by a body of research involving
different kinds of mental tasks, different task contexts, and
varying levels of task difficulty. In most of these studies
systolic blood pressure (SBP) has been shown to reliably
reflect effort mobilization (for reviews see Gendolla and
Brinkmann 2005; Wright 2008; Wright and Kirby 2001).
We tested our predictions with extreme groups of
undergraduate students with low scores (‘‘nondysphoric’’)
versus high scores (‘‘dysphoric’’) on a self-report depres-
sion scale. In accordance with our hypotheses, dysphoric
participants showed higher SBP reactivity than nondys-
phoric participants while working on mental tasks without
fixed performance standard (‘‘do your best’’) (Brinkmann
and Gendolla 2007). We concluded that dysphoric partic-
ipants evaluated the task as more difficult, which led to
higher cardiovascular reactivity during task performance
(see also Gendolla et al. 2001). In the following two studies
participants performed either an easy or a difficult mental
task (Brinkmann and Gendolla 2008). Both studies
revealed the expected crossover interaction pattern that had
previously been observed for manipulated negative and
positive moods (e.g., Gendolla and Kru¨sken 2002b; Sil-
vestrini and Gendolla 2009): Compared to nondysphoric
participants, dysphoric participants showed stronger SBP
reactivity in the easy condition (due to higher subjective
task demand) and weaker SBP reactivity in the difficult
condition (due to disengagement because of too high sub-
jective task demand). Moreover, task demand appraisals
assessed before task performance indicated that dysphoric
participants indeed perceived the memory task as more
difficult than did nondysphoric participants (Brinkmann
and Gendolla 2008, Study 2).
These findings show that task difficulty plays an
important role in determining whether depression leads to
enhanced or attenuated cardiovascular response. However,
these studies can only provide preliminary evidence for the
supposed informational mood impact on task demand
appraisals. On the one hand, task demand appraisals were
only assessed in the latter two studies. On the other hand,
these self-report ratings cannot provide causal evidence for
an informational mood impact on perceived task demand
being responsible for the differential impact on cardio-
vascular reactivity. Therefore, in the present study we
aimed to provide a conclusive test for the informational
impact of mood by manipulating mood’s diagnostic value.
Mood’s informational impact
One means for demonstrating an informational mood
impact on judgments and behavior consists in reducing
mood’s diagnostic value for (behavior-related) judgments
and evaluations. Accordingly, mood congruency effects
diminish when another source for the mood is made salient
(e.g., Schwarz and Clore 1983). This basic idea of reducing
mood’s diagnostic value has been used in a variety of
studies to demonstrate an informational mood impact (e.g.,
Bohner and Weinerth 2001; Hirt et al. 1997; Scott and
Cervone 2002). Interestingly, when people become aware
of their mood and its potential biasing effect on evaluations
and judgments they may not only ‘‘correct’’ for mood
influences but also produce contrast effects, that is,
‘‘overcorrect’’ the impact of their current (negative) mood
(see e.g., Abele and Gendolla 1999; Berkowitz et al. 2000;
Wegener and Petty 1997).
With respect to behavior-related judgments and effort
mobilization, Gendolla and Kru¨sken (2002a) could show
that a cue suggesting mood manipulation eliminated the
informational impact of experimentally induced mood.
After having watched depressing versus elating video
excerpts, half of the participants read a short note
explaining that previous research suggested that the video
excerpts may have long lasting effects on people’s feeling
states. Thus, contrary to participants who did not receive
this information, participants in the cue condition were
expected not to use their mood as diagnostic information
when working on a ‘‘do-your-best’’ task. Results corrobo-
rated the expected interaction pattern: SBP reactivity was
higher in a negative mood than in a positive mood when no
cue was provided; this mood effect diminished in the cue
condition. In the present study, we used a similar procedure
in order to demonstrate the informational influence of
depressed mood in a dysphoric sample. Moreover, we were
inspired by research by Tillema et al. (2001) who report a
cue manipulation that effectively diminished differences in
dysphoric and nondysphoric participants’ perceptions of
performance standards and self-efficacy.
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The present research
Taken together, there is evidence that dysphoria influences
effort mobilization, presumably because of an informa-
tional mood impact (Brinkmann and Gendolla 2007, 2008).
There is further evidence that reducing mood’s diagnostic
value allows for demonstrating an informational mood
impact (e.g., Gendolla and Kru¨sken 2002a; Schwarz and
Clore 1983). Therefore, in the present study, we provided
half of the dysphoric and half of the nondysphoric partic-
ipants with a cue making them aware of possible mood
influences (see Gendolla and Kru¨sken 2002a; Tillema et al.
2001). Subsequently we asked them to perform a memory
task during which cardiovascular measures were taken.
We expected a crossover interaction effect of dysphoria
and cue condition on cardiovascular (especially SBP)
reactivity during task performance: Without mood cue we
expected to find higher cardiovascular reactivity of dys-
phoric compared to nondysphoric participants, replicating
the results by Brinkmann and Gendolla (2007) and
reflecting higher perceived task demand in dysphoria.
When a mood cue was provided, we expected to find the
opposite pattern, that is, lower cardiovascular reactivity of
dysphoric compared to nondysphoric participants, reflect-
ing lower perceived task demand in dysphoria. This latter
hypothesis is based on the assumption that our rather strong
and directive cue manipulation (see below) should not only
effectively reduce the diagnostic value of participants’
momentary mood for task demand appraisals and thus the
informational mood impact on effort mobilization. Instead,
this strong cue manipulation should even lead to overcor-
rection, that is, to a mood contrast effect rather than a mere
reduction of the mood assimilation effect (see Stapel and
Suls 2007, for discussion).
Method
Participants and design
The present study was run in a 2 (dysphoric vs. nondys-
phoric) 9 2 (mood cue vs. no cue) between-persons
design. We recruited participants from an introductory
psychology class pool of 148 students (124 women, 24
men) by means of their scores on the Center for Epide-
miologic Studies—Depression Scale (CES-D; Radloff
1977) that they had completed 1–3 weeks before the
experimental session. Students who scored in the lower or
upper third of the distribution (i.e., B 9 or C 16) were
invited via an anonymous code and participated for partial
course credit. Only participants whose scores remained
within these limits at the second measurement time during
the experiment were retained for analyses. The final sample
consisted of 63 students (54 women, 9 men). Because the
cell distribution of the few men was unbalanced (i.e., no
men in the dysphoric-cue cell) we had to restrict our
analyses to the female participants only (mean age
22 years).
Self-report measures
Depression scores were assessed at the beginning of the
experimental session by means of the CES-D, a short self-
report scale that has been developed for community sam-
ples. The French version of the CES-D by Fuhrer and
Rouillon (1989) consists of 20 items asking for frequency
of depressive symptom experience during the past week on
4-point scales ranging from 0 (never, very seldom) to 3
(frequently, always). The scale showed high internal con-
sistency (Cronbach’s a = .93). For measuring participants’
momentary mood before and after task performance, we
administered a French version of the positive and negative
hedonic tone scales of the UWIST mood adjective check-
list (Matthews et al. 1990). In order to avoid biased
responses due to repeated assessments we split the scale in
two parts: Half of the adjectives (i.e., ‘‘joyful’’, ‘‘dissatis-
fied’’, ‘‘cheerful’’, ‘‘depressed’’) were presented before task
performance in order to assess initial mood, the remaining
four adjectives (i.e., ‘‘contented’’, ‘‘sad’’, ‘‘happy’’, ‘‘frus-
trated’’) were presented after task performance to assess
whether participants’ mood was affected by the mood cue
manipulation. Participants indicated the extent to which
each adjective reflected their momentary feeling state on
7-point scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much).
Finally, we assessed participants’ appraisal of task diffi-
culty and task-related capacity directly after task instruc-
tions (i.e., before task performance). Participants indicated
how they perceived task difficulty and how they perceived
their own task-related capacity on 7-point scales ranging
from 1 (not difficult, low capacity) to 7 (very difficult, high
capacity). As both ratings were conceptually similar and
moderately correlated, r(54) = -.37, p \ .01, we calcu-
lated a difficulty index by averaging the difficulty and the
reversed-coded capacity items so that higher scores indi-
cate higher perceived task difficulty.
Physiological measures
SBP, diastolic blood pressure (DBP), and heart rate (HR)
were measured noninvasively with a Vasotrac APM205A
monitor (MEDWAVE, St. Paul, MN). This system uses a
pressure sensor placed on the wrist on top of the radial
artery. Internal algorithms yield systolic, mean, and dia-
stolic pressure approximately every 12–15 heart beats,
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which are stored on an internal drive and transferred to a
personal computer.1
Continuous word recognition task
We used a continuous word recognition memory task (see
Kim et al. 2001; Poon and Fozard 1980). To this end, we
selected 125 French nouns from the data basis provided by
Bonin et al. (2003). As we were not interested in the impact
of a specific word type or its hedonic valence, the selection
process was guided by the intention to extract those
‘‘average’’ words of medium length, medium subjective
frequency in spoken and written French, and especially
without strong emotional valence. Therefore, words had to
fulfill several criteria to be eligible: word length of 5–7
letters, a subjective frequency and a subjective emotional
valence within one standard deviation below and above the
mean as indicated in the data basis of Bonin et al. (2003).2
Finally, the selected words were divided into four groups of
equal word length, frequency, and valence (three groups
contained 25 words and one group contained 50 words).
Based on these groups, the experimental software (E-Prime
2.0, Psychology Software Tools Inc., Pittsburgh, PA) ran-
domly created a list of 200 trials with the restriction that 25
words should be presented a second time after 10 inter-
vening words, another 25 words should be presented a
second time after 20 intervening words, still another 25
words should be presented a second time after 30 inter-
vening words, and, finally, 50 words should be presented
only once.
Contrary to usual recognition memory tasks, encoding
and recognition were embedded in one and the same period
by means of the continuous presentation of one trial after
the other. Each trial consisted of a fixation cross (1,000 ms)
followed by one word (unlimited presentation time). Par-
ticipants had to indicate with their dominant hand by means
of two keys if the word had already been presented in a
previous trial (‘‘old’’) or not (‘‘new’’). They were instructed
to work as quickly but also as precisely as possible (‘‘do
your best’’). After participants’ response there was a
500 ms inter-stimulus interval before the next trial started.
Depending on their reaction times, participants worked on
71–137 trials during the 5-min task period (M = 112.96,
SD = 14.18).
Procedure
Participants attended the experiment individually. Each
session took about 30 min and was computerized using a
personal computer and experimental software that pre-
sented all instructions and stimuli. Participants were gree-
ted by the experimenter, took a seat in front of the
computer monitor, read introductory information, and gave
informed consent. Afterwards, the experimenter attached
four pairs of electrodes for impedance cardiogram record-
ing (see Footnote 1) and fixed the blood pressure sensor on
participants’ nondominant wrist, left the room, and moni-
tored the experiment from an outside control room. Par-
ticipants first answered biographical questions and
completed the CES-D scale. This was followed by an
8-min habituation period to determine cardiovascular
baseline values; meanwhile participants watched an
excerpt of a hedonically neutral documentary film. Then,
participants rated the first 4 UWIST mood adjectives.
After this habituation period, all participants read the
same instructions for the continuous word recognition task
followed by an example screen. Afterwards, only partici-
pants in the cue condition received the following additional
written information in form of an important advice: ‘‘Prior
research has shown that your current mood, may it be
positive or negative, may have an important impact on
mental performance. During the following task, you should
thus bear in mind that your cognitive performance may be
influenced by your current mood.’’ Before starting the
continuous word recognition task, all participants rated the
extent of perceived task difficulty and task-related capac-
ity. Then the 5-min performance period began during
which cardiovascular activity was assessed. Following the
task all participants rated the remaining 4 UWIST mood
adjectives and learned that the experiment was over. The
experimenter entered the room and removed the blood
pressure sensor and the electrodes. Finally, participants
were thanked, carefully debriefed, and received their
course credit.
1 Recently, cardiac pre-ejection period (PEP; i.e., the time interval in
ms between the onset of ventricular depolarization and the opening of
the aortic valve) has been assessed in the framework of motivational
intensity theory (Brehm and Self 1989) as a reliable measure of
myocardial contractility (e.g., Annis et al. 2001; Richter et al. 2008).
Therefore, we also assessed and analyzed PEP reactivity by means of
the same impedance cardiograph and in the same way as described,
for instance, by Brinkmann et al. (2009). Due to a software upgrade
the sampling rate was 1,000 Hz without down-sampling—contrary to
previous studies. Unfortunately, due to contact problems with the
patient cable of the impedance cardiograph, there were no data
recordings for a quarter of the sample. Analyses based on the reduced
sample revealed no baseline differences between the four cells,
Fs \ 2.31, ps [ .13, overall M = 101.85, SD = 9.20. With respect to
PEP reactivity during task performance, there were no significant
main or interaction effects, Fs \ 3.02, ps [ .09. Cell means and
standard errors of PEP reactivity were as follows: Dysphoric-no cue
M = -.01, SE = .66; nondysphoric-no cue M = -2.22, SE = 1.07;
dysphoric-cue M = -3.59, SE = 1.63; nondysphoric-cue M =
-2.31, SE = .64.
2 Subjective frequency of the selected words ranged from 2.16 to
3.52 and subjective emotional valence ranged from 2.56 to 3.64 on
the 5-point rating scales.
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Data analysis
SBP and DBP values (in millimeters of mercury [mmHg])
and HR (in beats per minute [bpm]) obtained each 12–15
heart beats were edited for outliers using the following
procedure: single measures differing more than 3 standard
deviations from the preceding as well as from the following
measure were eliminated. Mean values for cardiovascular
baseline were determined by averaging the last 5 min of
the habituation period (Cronbach’s as[ .98). Mean values
for the task period were determined by averaging the 5 min
of task performance (Cronbach’s as[ .98). Change scores
were calculated by subtracting mean baseline values from
mean performance values (see Llabre et al. 1991). Due to
equipment failure of the Vasotrac monitor there were no
blood pressure and HR data from three participants,
reducing the sample size for cardiovascular analyses to 51
participants.
We calculated hit rate, false alarm rate, discrimination
(i.e., sensitivity), and response bias from participants’
responses to the continuous word recognition task in the
framework of signal detection theory. Following the rec-
ommendations of Snodgrass and Corwin (1988), a cor-
rected hit rate was defined as the number of correct
responses given an old word plus .5, divided by the total
number of old words plus 1. The corrected false alarm rate
was defined as the number of incorrect responses given a
new word plus .5, divided by the total number of new
words plus 1. Discrimination was calculated as the differ-
ence of hit rate minus false alarm rate. Finally, response
bias was calculated as false alarm rate divided by 1 minus
discrimination. For analyses we subjected all dependent
self-report, cardiovascular, and performance variables to 2
(dysphoric vs. nondysphoric) 9 2 (cue vs. no cue)
between-person ANOVAs, followed by focused contrasts
or post-hoc comparisons, depending on hypotheses.
Results
Self-report measures
Mood
We calculated two pre-task and two post-task mood indices
by averaging the positive and negative items, respectively,
before and after task performance, .44 \ r(54) \ .80,
ps \ .001. Cell means and standard errors appear in
Table 1. 2 9 2 ANOVAs of the pre-task measures revealed
the expected dysphoria main effects reflecting less positive
mood, F(1, 50) = 7.87, p \ .01, g2 = .12, and more neg-
ative mood, F(1, 50) = 42.97, p \ .001, g2 = .46, of
dysphoric compared to nondysphoric participants. There
was also an unexpected cue main effect on positive mood,
F(1, 50) = 5.11, p \ .03, g2 = .08, indicating more posi-
tive mood in the no-cue condition. However, as the cue
manipulation had not been given at the time of the first
mood assessment, we cannot conceive of a plausible
interpretation for this effect. What is more important is that
the results of the second assessment time after cue
manipulation and task performance still revealed the
expected dysphoria main effects, reflecting less positive
mood, F(1, 50) = 10.58, p \ .01, g2 = .17, and more
negative mood, F(1, 50) = 12.37, p \ .01, g2 = .19, of
dysphoric compared to nondysphoric participants. No other
main or interaction effect emerged, Fs \ 1.87, ps [ .17,
demonstrating that the cue manipulation did not alter par-
ticipants’ current mood.3
Task demand appraisals
The expected interaction effects for the single difficulty
and capacity items were not significant, F(1, 50) = 2.70,
p = .11, g2 = .05, and F(1, 50) = 2.54 p = .12, g2 = .05,
respectively. For the difficulty index results of a 2 9 2
ANOVA revealed a significant interaction, F(1, 50) =
3.96, p = .05, g2 = .07, in absence of significant main
effects, Fs \ 3.25, ps [ .07. Focused contrasts did not
show the expected higher perceived task demand of dys-
phoric participants in the no-cue condition, t(50) \ 1.
However, as expected, in the cue condition dysphoric
participants’ task demand appraisals were significantly
lower than those of nondysphoric participants, t(50) =
2.73, p \ .01, r = .36 (see Table 1).
Cardiovascular baselines
We subjected cardiovascular baseline values to 2 9 2
ANOVAs that revealed no SBP, DBP, or HR baseline dif-
ferences between the four cells (Fs \ 2.72, ps [ .10). Car-
diovascular baseline values can be found in Table 2.
Baseline values were not correlated with the respective
cardiovascular reactivity scores (-.14 \ r \ .04, ps [ .35).
3 These results hold also true when considering the overall mood
scores, composed of the positive and reversed-coded negative
adjectives (Cronbach’s as[ .76): There was a dysphoria main effect,
F(1, 50) = 33.27, p \ .001, g2 = .38, and a cue main effect, F(1,
50) = 4.56, p \ .04, g2 = .05, before task performance and a
dysphoria main effect, F(1, 50) = 17.03, p \ .001, g2 = .25, after
task performance. All positive, negative, and overall mood scores
were correlated with the depression score, r(54)s [ :43j j, ps \ .001.
These correlations replicate previous findings when the CES-D scale
was administered in the end, rather than at the beginning of the
experimental session (see Brinkmann et al. 2009).
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Cardiovascular reactivity
Systolic blood pressure
A 2 9 2 ANOVA of the SBP change scores revealed the
predicted interaction effect of dysphoria and cue, F(1,
47) = 5.45, p \ .03, g2 = .10, in absence of significant
main effects, Fs \ 3.57, ps [ .06 (see Fig. 1). Focused
contrasts revealed that dysphoric participants’ SBP reac-
tivity tended to be higher than that of nondysphoric par-
ticipants (M = 8.91, SE = 2.47 vs. M = 4.89, SE = .98),
t(47) = 1.63, p \ .06 (one-tailed), r = .23, when no cue
was given. In further accordance with predictions, this
pattern was reversed when participants received the cue
with respect to mood influences in the performance period
(M = 1.55, SE = 1.76 vs. M = 5.66, SE = 1.53), t(47) =
1.68, p = .05 (one-tailed), r = .24.
Diastolic blood pressure
The pattern of DBP change scores roughly mirrored that of
SBP reactivity. A 2 9 2 ANOVA revealed a significant
cue main effect, F(1, 47) = 5.18, p \ .03, g2 = .09, as
well as a marginally significant interaction effect of dys-
phoria and cue, F(1, 47) = 2.82, p \ .10, g2 = .05. Cell
means and standard errors were as follows: Dysphoric-no
cue M = 5.01, SE = 1.49; nondysphoric-no cue M =
3.91, SE = .71; dysphoric-cue M = .82, SE = 1.20; non-
dysphoric-cue M = 3.28, SE = .80.
Heart rate
The analysis of HR change scores revealed no significant
main or interaction effects, Fs(1, 47) \ 1.61, ps [ .21. Cell
means and standard errors were as follows: Dysphoric-no
cue M = 2.28, SE = 1.17; nondysphoric-no cue M = 4.18,
Table 1 Means and standard errors of self-report rating scores
M SE
1st mood measure 2nd mood measure Difficulty index 1st mood measure 2nd mood measure Difficulty index
Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative
No cue
Nondysphoric 4.86 1.18 4.86 1.68 3.04 .42 .11 .39 .23 .24
Dysphoric 3.83 2.92 4.08 2.50 3.08 .39 .43 .33 .41 .24
Cue
Nondysphoric 4.03 1.27 4.70 1.33 3.67 .37 .14 .32 .21 .23
Dysphoric 3.00 3.35 3.35 2.69 2.69 .23 .41 .24 .39 .32
All mood and difficulty ratings range from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much)
Table 2 Means and standard errors of cardiovascular baseline measures
M SE
SBP DBP HR SBP DBP HR
No cue
Nondysphoric 121.69 69.03 77.20 2.15 1.01 3.52
Dysphoric 118.65 67.64 79.34 2.48 1.42 3.44
Cue
Nondysphoric 115.45 64.35 79.55 3.39 2.39 3.16
Dysphoric 123.94 69.56 71.84 5.47 3.75 3.07
SBP and DBP are indicated in millimeters of mercury and HR is indicated in beats per minute
no cue
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Fig. 1 Cell means and standard errors of systolic blood pressure
(SBP) reactivity in millimeters mercury (mmHg)
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SE = .72; dysphoric-cue M = 2.52, SE = 1.63; nondys-
phoric-cue M = 1.64, SE = .87.
Task performance
We subjected the four performance indices hit rate, false
alarm rate, discrimination, and response bias to 2 9 2
ANOVAs. Means and standard errors can be found in
Table 3. Results revealed no differences in false alarm rate
(Fs \ 1) and discrimination (Fs \ 1.54, ps [ .22). For hit
rate, a significant interaction emerged, F(1, 50) = 3.90,
p = .05, g2 = .06, in absence of significant main effects
Fs \ 3.60, ps [ .06. Post-hoc comparisons using the Tu-
key HSD test showed that dysphoric participants in the cue
condition tended to have lower hit rates than the other three
groups, ps \ .09 (see Table 3). For response bias, results
revealed a marginally significant cue main effect, F(1,
50) = 3.08, p \ .09, g2 = .06. Moreover, it is interesting
to note that only dysphoric participants in the cue condition
differed significantly from the value .5 that is indicative of
a neutral response bias (Snodgrass and Corwin 1988),
t(12) = -3.02, p \ .02. One might thus conclude that
dysphorics receiving a mood cue were more reluctant with
regard to their ‘‘yes’’-responses, leading to a more con-
servative response bias. Finally, correlation analyses
revealed positive correlations between hit rate and both
SBP and DBP, r(51)s [ .46, ps \ .001, as well as between
discrimination and both SBP and DBP, r(51)s [ .30,
ps \ .03. Together with the performance decline in the
dysphoric-cue cell reported above, these correlations indi-
cate a positive association between effort mobilization and
performance outcomes.
Discussion
The aim of the present research was to provide a conclusive
test whether an informational mood impact underlies the
effect of dysphoria on effort mobilization. Based on
previous studies (Brinkmann and Gendolla 2007, 2008) we
reasoned that dysphoric participants should show higher
cardiovascular reactivity than nondysphoric participants
when working on a ‘‘do-your-best’’ task. This pattern
should be inversed when participants were provided with a
strong mood cue making them aware of possible mood
influences during task performance (Schwarz and Clore
1983; Tillema et al. 2001). Results corroborated that dys-
phoric participants showed higher SBP reactivity than
nondysphorics when no cue was provided, but lower SBP
reactivity when being aware of possible mood influences.
Even though the focused contrast in the no-cue condition
just fell short of significance, this SBP reactivity pattern
replicates the findings from Brinkmann and Gendolla
(2007) using a different type of mental task. Moreover, the
present study is also in accordance with the findings from
Gendolla and Kru¨sken (2002a) concerning manipulated
mood states under no-cue and cue conditions.
A close inspection of the SBP pattern reveals that the
dysphoria 9 cue interaction was mainly driven by the
reduction of SBP reactivity in dysphoric participants,
whereas nondysphoric participants’ reactivity was not
significantly affected by the cue. This resembles findings
by Schwarz and Clore (1983), who report a cue effect only
in the negative but not in the positive mood condition. The
authors concluded that a slightly positive mood state is
rather normal and thus not susceptible for searching its
source and discounting its effects. Similarly, it is con-
ceivable that participants’ implicit theories about mood
effects on performance play a role: Whereas dysphoric
participants may regard it as necessary to reduce their
negative mood’s impact during task performance, non-
dysphoric participants may consider their positive mood as
goal-conducive and thus show no changes.
The performance data also demonstrate the particular
impact of the cue manipulation for dysphoric participants:
There were no significant performance differences between
dysphoric and nondysphoric individuals when no cue was
given. When provided with the mood cue, however,
Table 3 Means and standard errors of continuous recognition memory task performance indices
M SE
Hit rate False alarm rate Discrimination Response bias Hit rate False alarm rate Discrimination Response bias
No cue
Nondysphoric .87 .15 .72 .53 .02 .04 .06 .06
Dysphoric .89 .20 .69 .56 .03 .08 .09 .08
Cue
Nondysphoric .88 .13 .74 .51 .02 .04 .06 .07
Dysphoric .75 .17 .58 .35 .06 .06 .11 .05
For calculation of hit rate, false alarm rate, discrimination index, and response bias index see ‘‘Data analysis’’ section and Snodgrass and Corwin
(1988)
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dysphoric participants had a lower hit rate and a more
conservative response bias. It seems that dysphorics
receiving the mood cue were more reluctant to affirm that
they had already seen the word. Moreover, the positive
correlations between SBP reactivity and hit rate and dis-
crimination suggest a positive association between effort
mobilization and performance. Even though the relation of
effort and performance is complex and the two constructs
cannot be equated (see Hockey 1997; Locke and Latham
1990), the results of this study underline the informational
influence of mood not only on effort mobilization but also
on corresponding performance outcomes.
For the interpretation of our findings it is important to
note that the cue manipulation affected blood pressure
reactivity, performance, and task demand appraisals but not
momentary mood itself. As expected, dysphoric individuals
were in a more negative and less positive mood not only at
the beginning of the experiment but also after the cue
manipulation and task performance. These results demon-
strate that the cue effectively reduced mood’s diagnostic
value for behavior-related judgments without altering par-
ticipants’ current mood. This strengthens the conclusion
that mood can be regarded as one piece of information for
evaluations and judgments (see Abele and Petzold 1994;
Gendolla 2000) and that an informational mood impact on
task demand appraisals underlies the influence of dysphoria
on cardiovascular reactivity.
Taken together, our study provides evidence that dys-
phoria effects on effort mobilization are mediated by an
informational impact of momentary mood: The replicated
pattern of stronger SBP response in dysphoric participants
working on mental ‘‘do-you-best’’ tasks can be reversed
when asking participants to try not to be influenced by their
current mood during task execution. Reducing the influ-
ence of one’s negative mood is thus possible in a sample of
participants with high depression scores. In contrast to our
dysphoric sample, studies by Gasper and Clore (1998) have
revealed that people with high trait anxiety do not reduce
the impact of their current mood when making risk esti-
mates, even if alternative sources for their current feelings
are provided. Instead, they rely on their trait-consistent
anxious affect that is perceived as relevant for the judg-
ments to be made (see also Gasper and Clore 2000).
Given these differences, the specific nature of our cue
manipulation deserves further discussion. We were
inspired by research from Tillema et al. (2001), who dis-
tinguish between an attributional cue—that is, a cue
highlighting an external source for the current mood (i.e.,
the weather, the room, the mood induction method)—and
an awareness cue—that is, a cue drawing people’s atten-
tion to the possibility of mood influences on the judgment
or task at hand without necessarily suggesting an external
source for the current mood. In the present study, we
provided participants with a mood awareness cue, which is
a rather direct and explicit instruction, in contrast to other
studies that provided an attributional cue, which is
undoubtedly a more subtle and weaker manipulation. In
light of previous studies—especially those on trait-anxiety
by Gasper and Clore (1998)—future research should
investigate whether our findings are limited to situations
where people are made aware of mood influence or whe-
ther our findings can be generalized to attributional cues.
An important implication of our findings pertains to the
domain of affect control and regulation. It has been shown
repeatedly that depressed and dysphoric individuals have
problems controlling and regulating their negative affect
(e.g., Joormann and Siemer 2004; Josephson et al. 1996;
Lyubomirsky et al. 1998). Our findings demonstrate that—
in a non-clinical sample—these problems can be overrid-
den by an explicit and direct instruction. Thus, control of
mood influences is possible in dysphoric individuals (see
also Hertel 2000; Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema
1995; Pyszczynski et al. 1989, for examples of overcoming
self-regulation deficits in depression and dysphoria).
An obvious limitation of this study concerns our female
sample. Because of the few and unequally distributed men
in our sample, we had to restrict analyses to women only.
However—except for the usual differences in cardiovas-
cular baseline values (Wolf et al. 1997)—previous research
has not shown different cardiovascular reactivity to mental
tasks in men and women (e.g., Brinkmann and Gendolla
2008). Therefore, we are confident that our conclusions
apply to men as well.
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